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Abstract
This  article  examines  how  contending  constructions  of  safe  space  for
migrants reflect the geopoliticization of  humanitarianism and its geosocial
discontents. It contrasts geopolitical constructions of safe space that have
been used by European authorities to justify and administer Hotspots with
geosocial  efforts  to  construct  safe  space  through  practices  of  solidaristic
accommodation.  The article  documents  the ways in  which  Hotspots  have
made migrants unsafe, even as they have been simultaneously justified in
humanitarian terms as making both Europe and refugees safer.  It  further
illustrates,  by contrast,  how counter constructions of  safe space can take
divergent  geosocial  forms.  These  varied  geosocial  formations  of
accommodation  emerge  out  of  embodied  space-making  struggles  for
physical  safety,  personal  dignity,  organizational  autonomy,  radical
democracy,  spatial  liberty,  and  social  community.  They  create  context-
contingent  alternatives  to Hotspot  geopolitics  as well  as opportunities  for
migrants and their allies to critique the limits of official humanitarianism.  But
they  also  remain  overdetermined  by  the  dominant  border  politics  that
Hotpots  are  supposed  to  secure.   For  these  reasons,  the  borderlands
between  the  abstract  geopolitics  of  Hotspot  humanitarianism  and  the
embodied  geosocial  constructions  of  solidarity,  show safe space to  be at
once complex, compromised, and constantly contested.
Safe space sounds simple and easy to identify.  However, in this paper we 
show how contested constructions of safe space for migrants in Europe 
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contend with one another, creating complexly interconnected experiences of
relative safety and precarity. We contrast geopolitical constructions of safe 
space that have been used by European authorities in the creation of 
Hotspots with what we describe as geosocial efforts to construct safe space 
through practices of solidarity.  These solidarity practices by activists and 
refugees in open camps and accommodation centers demonstrate a practical
concern with making migration safer in situated, embodied and relational 
ways. They involve transnational but also local space-making struggles that 
we explore in terms of physical safety, personal dignity, organizational 
autonomy, radical democracy, spatial liberty, and social community. By 
contrast, the geopolitical depictions and declarations of safe space by 
European officials have endangered migrants by variously curtailing and 
channeling their movements. Instead of making movement safer, they have 
thereby imposed a mix of coercive immobility and mobility together in ways 
that undermine efforts to construct embodied spaces of migrant safety. In 
the resulting borderlands between the abstract geopolitics of Hotspot 
humanitarianism and the embodied geosocial constructions of solidarity, safe
space emerges as a complex, compromised, and continually contested 
construction.
By comparing the dangers created by Hotspot geopolitics with the 
geosocial struggles to secure embodied forms of safety through solidarity 
activism, our first main goal in what follows is to offer a critical investigation 
of how the safe space discourses of European authorities are contributing to 
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a geopoliticisation of humanitarianism. Following Jennifer Hyndman, we are 
interested in how such geopoliticisation leads to “the flotsam and jetsam of 
conflict [being] sequestered spatially out of view or in between the cracks of 
territorial jurisdiction” (Hyndman 2012: 245).  Reciprocally, by drawing on 
two case studies of solidarity accommodation in Greece, our second goal is 
to highlight the work of activists and migrants in countering the 
sequestration produced by the geopolitical depictions and declarations of 
safe space. In this way we seek to contribute to broader efforts to document 
the agency of migrants themselves – often working in solidarity with 
students, activists, academics, and volunteers – to transform the conditions 
of migrant life, as well as to problematize the rhetoric of migrants as victims 
or threats. Drawing on critical theories of borders, migration, geopolitics, and
the geosocial, we seek thus to contribute to recent research into the spaces 
of migrant belonging and place-making in contemporary Europe (e.g. Atac, 
2016; Mudu and Chattopadhyay, 2017), as well as to investigate further how 
it is variously challenged and channeled by sites such as Hotspots (e.g. 
Antonakaki, et al, 2016; Fassin, 2016; Painter, et al, 2016; and Tazzioli, 
2016). Highlighting the limits of liberal humanitarianism in practice, the goal 
is to show how the negotiation of these limits in borderland geographies 
continually re-contests and re-constitutes the meaning of safe space.   
Theoretically we think that these shifting borderlands of safe space indicate 
a need to adapt Foucauldian arguments about ‘making live’ and ‘rejecting 
into death’ in modern biopolitics in order to come to terms with a wide range
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of intermediate experiences of ‘sub-citizenship’ between the poles of 
biopolitical enfranchisement and necropolitical rejection (Fassin, 2009; 
Sparke, 2017 and 2018).  And this, we also want to suggest, means taking 
Foucault’s own injunction about the critical edge-work of European 
enlightenment quite literally: in short “we must go beyond the outside-inside
alternative; we must be at the frontiers” (Foucault,1984: 45). 
Contemporary scholars of borders in Europe have already made 
important interventions in borderlands and citizenship studies with analyses 
of border control externalization around the periphery of so-called EUrope’s 
‘Mediterranean neighborhood’ (Collyer, 2016; de Genova, 2016; Vaughan-
Williams, 2011). As these interventions make clear, geopolitics is at once an 
active ingredient and unstable outcome of the power dynamics made legible 
at Europe’s borders. Echoing Etienne Balibar, Luiza Bialasiewicz suggests 
that EUrope’s borders have thereby become “spaces of the political itself” 
where studying the EU’s “border-work” simultaneously offers insight into 
“EUropean geopolitics”  (Bialasiewicz, 2011: 2-3). As such, it is a geopolitics 
that is constantly renegotiated and remade on the EU’s borders, precisely in 
sites such as Hotspots, through which geopolitical discourses come to have a
wide range of biopolitical and necropolitical effects (Vaughan-Williams, 
2011). 
It is these entanglements in between  biopolitics and necropolitics that 
in turn prompt us to draw on both critical theories of geopolitics that 
emphasize the power of representation in constructing geopolitical 
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discourses, and  the wide range of radical scholarship that has underlined 
the material, emotional, and frequently lethal forces that remain influential 
amidst and on such geopolitical scripting (Dixon and Marston, 2011; 
Hyndman, 2007; Mostafanezhad, 2017; Sharp, 2013). Following feminist 
arguments in these literatures, we are especially interested in the ways that 
embodied and situational accounts of how people negotiate geopolitics on 
the ground can challenge the top-down territorialization of state space and 
open new opportunities for examining political autonomy and resistance 
relationally (Naylor, 2017).
Recent critical research by migration and refugee scholars has further 
complicated state-making maps of geopolitical territory by addressing the 
experiences and encounters of migrants (and migration officials) as they 
negotiate borders and attempt to construct transnational lives and homes 
through local relationships (Loyd and Mountz, 2014; Martin, 2012).  As 
Katherine Brickell (2012) underlines, such research can usefully complicate 
dominant geopolitical discourses of homeland security by raising new 
questions about migrants (and others) seeking the security of safe homes 
across geopolitical boundaries.  In a related way, we turn to recent work on 
geopolitics that emphasizes the geosocial as a name for the social 
geographic imaginations and associated practices connecting people across 
borders, including through transnational migrant activism (Mitchell and 
Kallio, 2017). Our two main examples of geosocial solidarity – City Plaza 
Hotel (also known as the Refugee Accommodation Center) in Athens and 
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Lesvos Solidarity (formerly known as PIKPA) – rely on transnational ties of 
solidarity to sustain their radical actions with migrants and in opposition to 
geopolitical scriptings of safe space. These types of transnational 
connections bring both attention and financial resources to the local space-
making projects in ways that enable them to contest and resist—for a time at
least—the imperatives of EU and state control. In the process, they unveil 
the geopolitical scripts of safe space that are deployed to justify and 
administer the Hotspots as discourses that actively turn the care claims of 
liberal humanitarianism into spatial practices of control (Pallister-Wilkins, 
2018).
The article is organized as follows. In the first section we analyze the 
rhetoric and implementation of Hotspot geopolitics in Europe and its 
repercussions for migrant safety. We document how the Hotspots have been 
both justified and administered in ways that project geopolitical constructs of
safety, and we highlight how this has nevertheless led to increased precarity 
for migrants. We follow this with studies of two distinct counter-hegemonic 
efforts to create local spaces of safety for migrants, efforts that, despite their
many differences, simultaneously mobilize geosocial connections to sustain 
embodied practices and experiences of care over time. The first of these 
involves the squatted hotel, City Plaza, organized in Athens by the Refugee 
Accommodation and Solidarity Network. The second is an open camp on the 
island of Lesvos originally named PIKPA but now, at the insistence of the 
local authorities, called Lesvos Solidarity. This camp was initiated by local 
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residents and is now organized and run by migrants, residents, and 
volunteers. While City Plaza’s solidarity with migrants is inspired more by 
anarchist politics and discourses of resistance, and while Lesvos Solidarity 
appeals instead to ideas about supporting resilience amongst the most 
vulnerable, the two initiatives share a common geosocial approach to 
making safe space through grassroots networking. In the conclusion we 
return to review what the comparisons between our examples illustrate 
about the continually contested character of safe space in Europe’s 
borderlands. 
These observations and arguments are underpinned by three and a 
half months of empirical research in Europe in Autumn, 2016, specifically in 
Lesvos, Athens, Brussels, Berlin and Geneva. During this period we 
conducted 32 semi-structured interviews with a mix of representatives from 
inter-governmental agencies (UNHCR, WHO, IOM), NGOs (MSF, MDM, PICUM, 
ESI), solidarity spaces (City Plaza, PIKPA) and associated volunteers. 
Additionally, we engaged in short periods of participant observation as 
volunteers at City Plaza and Lesvos Solidarity. Before, during and after this 
time, we continued to follow official announcements from EU authorities and 
their critics about the purpose of Hotspots and the related development of 
safe space discourses designed to justify and administer the processing of 
refugee asylum claims in Hotspots. It is to these geopolitical discourses that 
we turn next before proceeding to look at their geosocial contestation.
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Section 1: Hotspots and the Geopolitical Construction of ‘Safe 
Space’
“The aim of the Hotspot approach,” explained the EU Migration, Home 
Affairs and Citizenship Commissioner in July of 2015, was “to provide a 
platform for [EU] agencies to intervene, rapidly and in an integrated manner,
in frontline Member States when there is a crisis due to specific and 
disproportionate migratory pressure at their external borders” 
(Avramopoulos, 2015: 2). The approach was also meant to make “visible” 
the effectiveness of this integrated EU “support” while also insisting that the 
“assistance” of Commission-controlled agencies was designed to preserve 
the sovereignty of Member States even as it aimed at enforcing their 
compliance with EU migration rules. For these overlapping reasons, the 
construction of the Hotspots had geopolitical ramifications from the start. 
Numerous geopolitical discourses and displays came to be performed in the 
actual spaces of intervention, and geopolitical complications over 
sovereignty have continued to frustrate the visibilization of coordinated 
control. Yet as Didier Fassin has underlined, the Hotspots nevertheless also 
produced a clear geopolitical outcome: “They achieved a new frontierization 
of the border control regime” (Fassin, 2016).
Our analysis begins with Fassin’s observation but also builds on the 
nuances added by critical geographers, including other Hotspot studies 
published here in Society and Space. This emerging work has focused 
attention on the performance of EU governance within Hotspots, arguing that
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they are sites where the determination of insiders and outsiders highlighted 
by Fassin also illustrates how EU authority and identity are established or are
imagined as being established through the avowedly humanitarian 
processing of migrants (Antonakaki et al, 2016; Pallister-Wilkins, 2018). We 
augment these critiques by adding the observation that the triage and 
rejection work of the Hotspots is both being secured by geopolitical 
constructions of safety and contested by geosocial counter-constructions of 
safety. 
Two particular geopolitical constructions of safe space have come 
together in the Hotspots. First, is the justificatory construction of the 
Hotspots as safety-enhancing spaces that will safeguard the security of 
Europe and the overall well-being of migrants at the same time. Second, is 
the administrative construction of ‘safe space’ inside the Hotspot processing 
spaces themselves. In combination, these geopolitical discourses have 
actually served to endanger migrants, rendering them vulnerable to unsafe 
living conditions in and around the Hotspots, along with the numerous 
dangers posed by delay, diversion and deportation due to how the Hotspots 
have created movement-controlling forms of containment beyond detention 
itself (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018). 
i)  Justificatory geopolitics
 Presented by the EU as a way of protecting Frontline Member States 
from the crisis of ‘disproportionate migratory pressure, the justificatory 
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geopolitical discourse of securing the safety of Europe also came with claims 
that the Hotspots would help make the Mediterranean safe for migrants by 
creating safer pathways than those used by smugglers. Hotspots were 
presumed thus to ‘safeguard’ the EU, EU values, and migrants all at once; 
doing so, as Pallister-Wilkins (2018) makes clear, by proffering  Hotspot 
humanitarianism as a response to rising reactionary rejectionism in the EU. 
The result was a discourse of justification that was as much about forcefully 
responding to the geopolitical discontents of nationalistic insiders as 
managing geopolitical fears about pressures coming from the outside. 
Announced as a coordinated EU response to the migratory ‘crisis’, the 
Hotpots were clearly meant to quell a crisis of confidence in the EU itself. 
The basic bureaucratic plan justified by this double-duty discourse was 
itself quite simple: namely to co-locate and coordinate in the Hotspots the 
work of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), the EU Border Agency 
(FRONTEX), the EU Police Cooperation Agency (EUROPOL) and the EU Judicial
Cooperation Agency (EURIJUST). The still narrower aim was to monitor and 
enforce Greek and Italian compliance with the EU’s Dublin regulations (the 
regulations that, with some exceptions, make Member States where 
migrants first arrive responsible for asylum screening). But just as this 
compliance enforcement was coded as ‘capacity-building’ to help deal with 
the ‘crisis’ in the frontline states, the larger justification for these 
interventions was tied to concerns about protecting the EU from perceived 
geopolitical threats coming from both the outside and the inside at the same 
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time. The British Border Force boat named ‘Protector’ that was moored in 
Mytilene harbor during our fieldwork on Lesvos was a highly visible symbol of
this geopolitics of protection. Moreover, the fact that during our time on the 
island it was not once engaged in actually protecting the safety of refugees 
trying to cross from Turkey was indicative of the wider concealment of 
danger and damage that, as we show below, has been made possible by the 
geopolitical constructions of safe space.1 
The justificatory discourse of the EU’s approach was also remarkable 
for the ways it combined its guidance for the bureaucratic processes to be 
performed in the Hotspots with advice about how these processes should 
determine asylum and deportation decisions (e.g. Avramopoulos, 2015a).  
Throughout the official EU discourse the promise of efficient and, as Martina 
Tazzioli (2016) has underlined, speedy bureaucracy is suggested as bringing 
security and safety: whether it was by accelerating the screening work of 
border control, expediting asylum, or fast-tracking investigations of 
smuggling and trafficking. Meanwhile, the violence and dangers of 
deportation (including the dangers of being made to wait for deportation in 
the Hotspots) were obscured with simple and safe-sounding references to 
“return operations… [f]or those who are not in need of protection” 
(Avramopoulos, 2015).    As we shall see, these sorts of innocuous assertions
about returning migrants to places where they do not need protection have 
1 For an image of this boat and other figures from our research, please see 
our photographic essay on the Society and Space open access site (Mitchell 
and Sparke, 2018).
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relied, in turn, on geopolitical projections of safe-space in the administration 
of Hotspot screening. But before we investigate how these administrative 
imaginations of safe space have been used to curtail Geneva protections, it 
is important to address one other consequential iteration of the justificatory 
discourse that began on March 18th, 2016 with the announcement from 
Brussels of the EU-Turkey agreement. 
        “In order to break the business model of the smugglers and to offer 
migrants an alternative to putting their lives at risk,” explained the European
Council, “the EU and Turkey today decided to end the irregular migration 
from Turkey to the EU” (European Council, 2016). “The aim,” it was later 
explained in the EU’s implementation statement, was to make migrants safer
by replacing “disorganised, chaotic, irregular and dangerous migratory flows 
by organised, safe and legal pathways to Europe for those entitled to 
international protection in line with EU and international law” (European 
Commission, 2016). To achieve this switch to safer legal pathways the deal 
envisioned two major innovations in migration management, both of which 
were reputedly meant to reduce danger by redirecting flows. The first was to 
start returning all non-admissible migrants to Turkey from the Greek islands 
as a form of deterrence; in the EU’s words, “to make clear that this is a 
dangerous route and the wrong route” (European Commission, 2016). The 
second was to start resettling displaced Syrians from Turkey into the EU. 
Meanwhile, as part of the formal agreement, Greece was asked to adapt its 
Hotspots to facilitate fast returns while also providing “closed” detention 
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facilities inside Hotspots “to avoid irregular migrants absconding when they 
are subject to return decisions” (European Commission, 2016).
        Even though the calls on the Greek government to provide for fast 
deportations and detention for irregular migrants made visible the work of 
rejection, the sanitized language of ‘returns’ and ‘closed’ facilities came 
together with a rhetorical emphasis on protecting migrant safety. This 
rhetoric served to consolidate the justificatory discourse of making the 
Mediterranean a ‘safe space’. Moreover, even the work of deportation back 
to Turkey was justified in the language of ‘safe-guarding’ migrant rights, 
honoring the Geneva Conventions, and protecting refugees from 
refoulement. For these reasons, Greece was obliged in the deal-making “to 
provide a legal framework for the implementation of the 'first safe country of 
asylum' and 'safe third country' principles’ and thereby to recognize Turkey 
as a ‘safe third country’ to which migrants could be safely returned 
(European Commission, 2016). 
ii)   Administrative geopolitics
        There are two basic reasons why the administrative geopolitics of safe 
space declarations have created new dangers for migrants. First, by 
geopolitically re-labeling various dangerous countries as ‘safe countries of 
origin’, ‘safe countries of asylum’ and ‘safe third countries’ they allow for the
deportation of refugees to places such as Turkey that are not actually safe 
for the majority of people being returned. Second, by creating endless delays
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in the determination of deportability to these non-safe ‘safe’ spaces, the 
actual administrative implementation of the ‘safe country’ principles has 
allowed for the indefinite detention of refugees in increasingly unhealthy and
hazardous Hotspot camps. 
The fundamental problem with EU declarations of ‘safe space’ is the 
way that they constrict and circumscribe the legal responsibility of Member 
States to protect refugees. In place of the liberal biopolitics of protecting 
individuals that is enshrined in the Geneva Conventions, these declarations 
effectively substitute an illiberal geopolitics aimed at externalizing the work 
of rejection. Even before the implementation of safe third country principles 
in Hotspots, the evolving EU asylum rules had been moving towards a 
common regime mandating Member State authorities to use the massive 
territorially-encompassing safe space designations as pre-emptive 
alternatives to assessing the merits of particular individual cases. In 
response, critical legal analyses have highlighted the illiberal 
territorialization of Geneva protections this has entailed (ECRE, 2015; 
Hopkins, 2009; Hunt, 2014).  Such critics question whether safe country 
principles can ever be compliant with liberal human rights protections, and 
argue further that the associated deflection of Geneva protection 
responsibilities results directly from the geopoliticization of the safe country 
designations by foreign policy agencies and agendas. 
Given the pre-existing trend towards circumscribing Geneva 
protections for asylum-seekers, the EU-Turkey agreement of 2016 served to
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render the illiberal implications of safe-country designations that much 
more visible.  By making Turkey the re-admission target of deportations 
from Greek Hotspots, and by thereby obliging Greece to recognize Turkey 
as a safe third country, the deal also brought the geopolitical contradictions
out into the open. In a comprehensive critique of the EU-Turkey deal 
Amnesty International noted that Turkey simply was not safe for asylum-
seekers, thereby making the EU-Turkey agreement “illegal and 
unconscionable” (Amnesty, 2016). Amnesty’s brief highlighted three main 
reasons why the assumption that Turkey was safe was a “fiction”: first, the 
lack of good asylum processes; second the lack of durable solutions such as
integration and resettlement; and third, the lack of decent options for work,
subsistence and shelter in Turkey. Amnesty’s European migration specialist
expanded on these points to argue that: “Turkey does not have a fully-
functioning asylum system and should never have been deemed a safe 
country for asylum-seekers, when all evidence suggests that international 
protections required under the Refugee Convention are not in place” 
(Kosmopoulos, 2016). 
The other notable problem of the Hotspots has been that although 
they were initially projected from Brussels as spaces of fast, targeted and 
coordinated administrative action to move asylum-seekers along, they have
become sites of delay, detention and, in an increasing number of cases, 
death. While the justificatory geopolitics and administrative geopolitics of 
the Hotspots construct them in sanitized terms as being concerned with 
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safety for both Europeans and migrants, in practice, the opposite is the 
case for many asylum-claimants. To adapt the terms of Michael Collyer’s 
critique of deportation dynamics elsewhere in Europe, the system works as 
a technology of sub-citizenship that enforces re-territorialization by 
physically and often violently re-assigning individuals to particular 
projections of ‘safe space’ (Collyer, 2012).  
In place of the coercive mobility imagined by the advocates of the EU-
Turkey deal, the Hotspots have become squalid sites of coercive immobility 
where the close ties between deportability and detainability have become 
brutally obvious (cf. De Genova 2016b: 5). Moreover, as Garelli and Tazzioli 
(2016, 2018) argue, they create a powerfully pre-emptive frontier effect. The
intimidating barbed wire and multiple layers of fencing around and inside the
Moria camp on Lesvos are indicative in this way of the dangerous re-
territorializations constructed by Hotspot geopolitics more generally. As the 
“Moria is A Jail!” graffiti on the main road to Mytilene also makes clear, these
re-territorializations result in the creation of what migrants experience as a 
mix of penal and parole-like conditions of highly circumscribed movement. 
“Lesvos is a jail!” declared a Pakistani teenager to us, poignantly underlining 
the difference between our freedom and his containment as we drove him 
into the city in a rental car. And in practice these penal conditions and gated 
movements have made migrants increasingly unsafe.
 
iii) Unsafe Hotspots
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Reporting on the coercive immobility experienced by over 60,000 
refugees detained in Greece after the EU-Turkey deal, the global health 
NGO Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) was scathing in its 2016 report. They 
wrote: “Appalling conditions are still the norm for all those stuck in the 
camps” (MSF, 2016). MSF went on to list many other more systemic 
dangers of chronic uncertainty, insecurity and loss of family integrity facing 
those detained in the Hotspots, as well as a long list of practical problems 
including poor food, sanitation, lighting, and access to hygiene. The report 
highlighted how refugees have also been exposed to insect bites, snakes 
and harsh heat in the summer, while also being extremely vulnerable to 
winter weather because of the flimsy nature of many camp shelter 
materials. 
Subsequent to the publication of this October report, MSF’s warnings 
about the threats posed by the bad conditions and winter cold in the 
Hotspots were proved tragically accurate. In late Autumn, 2016, fires broke 
out, killing and injuring detainees in Hotspots. These included at Moria 
where a cooking gas container exploded, killing a Kurdish woman and her 
grandchild. In December and January, the following year, thousands of 
refugees suffered through sub-zero temperatures in unheated tents 
covered with snow. As a result, there were more deaths, including again at 
Moria when three more refugees died while trying to warm themselves (Al 
Jazeera, 2017). Then in early February, 2017, Human Rights Watch received
a text from a 30-year-old Iranian asylum seeker detained on Lesvos 
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reporting on the increasing death and despair all around. “[P]eople died in 
cold in the camp,” read the text, “an Iranian attempted suicide and an 
Egyptian hung himself. Yesterday, a Pakistani died, and last week, an 
[Egyptian] died in the bathroom. I attempted suicide by cutting my vein last
week but I am still alive….” (Cossé, 2017).
The Hotspot projections of safe space have also created and 
concealed more systemic forms of danger due to delay, detention and 
generalized dysfunction in and between the camps.  As with the effects of 
violent inaction in camps elsewhere in Europe such as Calais (Davies et al, 
2017), the supposedly humanitarian Hotspots have thereby created sub-
citizenship experiences of abandonment. Depression and widespread signs 
of hopelessness were already reported by MSF in 2016, including 
statements from refugees comparing their camp experiences unfavorably 
with the war-zones from which they had escaped (MSF 2016: 24) The net 
result of the problems is the antithesis of safety: in short, as the Danish-
Iraqi founder of Team Humanity told reporters for Al Jazeera, "Greece is not 
a safe place to live for refugees" (Strickland and Safdar, 2017). Even the 
Greek Minister of Migration was obliged to agree as arctic air blasted the 
Aegean in January, 2017. “The situation in the hot spots is very bad,” 
Yannis Mouzalas, acknowledged. “Conditions on the islands are awful” 
(Smith, 2017).  Asked to speak about this from Brussels, a spokeswoman 
for the European commission also had to agree. “The situation is 
untenable,” she said (Smith, 2017). However, she also had a coda letting 
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the Commission off the hook.  “But we also have to be clear,” she insisted, 
“that ensuring adequate reception conditions in Greece is a responsibility of
Greek authorities.” 
The EU’s outsourcing of responsibility is unconvincing because of how 
the Hotspot approach has been dictated to Greece from the start, along with 
the harsh austerity measures that have limited the ability of the Greek 
government to respond to the needs of refugees. However, this has not 
stopped Greek solidarity activists and social justice volunteers from around 
the world from working with refugees to provide alternatives. These alliances
work to counter the dangers posed by Hotspots geopolitics with the 
geosocial construction of safe spaces inspired by visions of resistance and 
resilience. It is to these efforts that we now turn.
Section 2: Geosocial Constructions of Safety through Solidarity
 In contrast to the geopoliticization of humanitarianism seen in the 
Hotspots, the efforts to create safe spaces for migrants through solidarity 
represent a different approach that we describe here in terms of geosocial 
practice. Instead of the geopolitical performance of care turned control 
through Hotspot abstractions about borders, territory and safety, these 
geosocial practices of safe space construction are distinguished by their mix 
of transnational, but also personal and embodied, modes of social justice-
inspired protection. As such they connect ancient ideas about hospitality and
19
welcoming foreigners with the post-liberal and anti-neoliberal praxis of 
cohabitation, democratic self-government and activism, all explicitly 
organized amidst and against dispossession. 
Our two main examples are self-organized accommodation spaces built
on principles of solidarity and autonomous management. City Plaza 
articulates migrant solidarity with a politics of collective urban resistance and
anarchist revolt against neoliberal state-making, whereas Lesvos Solidarity’s 
approach to solidarity emphasizes efforts at building resilience locally 
through forms of personalized care that aim at relieving the suffering 
inflicted by the liberal humanitarianism of the Hotspots.  Although different 
in these ways, both solidarity initiatives have nevertheless developed explicit
social justice agendas of securing space to help vulnerable groups wrest 
back a modicum of control over their lives and futures. As a result, and in 
contradistinction from Hotspot geopolitics, we argue that they represent 
interventions that, even if temporary, offer geosocially accountable forms of 
safe space.
The City Plaza Refugee Accommodation Center houses about 400 
people, with 180 children among them. It is located in a former hotel in 
central Athens, the City Plaza, that had been abandoned as a commercial 
site in 2011, and which was taken over by activists and refugees in April, 
2016. The hotel infrastructure—including a big kitchen, a lounge-bar, a large 
dining room, numerous toilets, meeting rooms, and seven floors with 
individual rooms—has proved invaluable in providing good quality 
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accommodation, food, and sanitation. Additionally, the building’s history has 
allowed for various culture-jamming representations that aim at re-
appropriating European hospitality traditions and re-naming the hotel as a 
so-called Five Star Squat (Cirefice, 2018).  Importantly, because the City 
Plaza Center is in the space of a former hotel with over 90 rooms, it is able to
accommodate every refugee family in a separate room. Unlike many other 
informal refugee sites that tend to be spatially segregated by nationality, an 
organizer emphasized to us that it is also deliberately international, mixing 
nine nationalities of refugees and twenty nationalities of activists. Migrant 
nationalities include Syrians, Iranians, Iraqis, Kurds, Afghanis, Pakistanis and 
Palestinians. As a solidarian and participant researcher V’cenza Cirefice 
(2018) has documented in much greater detail than we can here, many of 
these groups attest to City Plaza becoming their ‘home’.
 Lesvos Solidarity was started by volunteers in 2012 in the context of 
difficulties in the main reception centers and increasing numbers of asylum 
claimants arriving on the island in distress. The site, which is located in an 
old children’s summer camp, was initially envisioned as a temporary safe 
place for especially vulnerable migrants, including pregnant women, 
children, and the disabled, as well as those who were sick. It has also served 
a small number of Greek citizens who have been made homeless by poverty 
and illness. During the peak year of migrant arrivals in 2015, volunteers used
the grounds and facilities to organize and distribute meals to over 3,000 
people daily. They also collected and distributed clothing to migrant 
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reception centers across the island. The camp now serves about 100 people 
on-site – providing a health clinic in an old caravan, as well as a small 
community garden and kitchen. Additionally, it helps to celebrate and 
promote the residents' cross-cultural connections with murals and multiple 
events for the children.
To testify to the radical actions of migrants and activists at City Plaza 
and Lesvos Solidarity, and to contrast their geosocial construction of safe 
space with the geopolitics of the Hotspots, we outline six counter-
constructions of safety that are practiced on the ground in these two sites. 
These are: i) physical safety: through the provision of basic conditions for 
survival and social reproduction in areas of housing, clothing, food, and 
health; ii) personal dignity: through mutual relations of respect and human 
connection; iii) organizational autonomy: through initiating and sustaining 
the sites and their quotidian practices; iv) radical democracy: through 
organizing heterogeneous ties of political networking both locally and 
transnationally; v) spatial liberty: through asserting rights of mobility, 
especially free movement in and out of the sites; and vi) social community: 
through working together in solidarity across differences and with neighbors 
to sustain the sites. These six geosocial practices of constructing safe space 
do not describe everything important happening in these sites of activist 
accommodation, but we believe they give a good summary of how the 
participants have been able to work in the larger context overshadowed by 
Hotspot geopolitics to construct safe space geosocially. 
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i) Physical Safety 
Physical safety is a necessity of life at the most fundamental level. The 
security of being free of targeted violence and having basic survival needs 
met enables people to participate in other areas of social, political and 
economic life. A pamphlet put out in October, 2016, by the City Plaza on the 
anniversary of its sixth month in operation highlighted the importance of 
such physical safety with “fragments of memories, thoughts, feelings” 
derived from interviews with eight of the original residents (City Plaza, 2016).
In contrast to the Hotspot detainees declaring an interest in returning to war-
zones, we read of joy in the physical experience of reaching a non-violent 
space:
“The first day was a happy day for me. I was in a bad place before… 
You know I come from Kunduz. People are dying there. Now I can’t talk 
often with my father and my mother on the phone. But I have told 
them that I am in a safe place…. ” (M., Afghanistan; City Plaza, 2016)
“In here I learned about humanity. I feel safe here. It is my family. We 
are free. We get education. I am happy.”  (J., Iran; City Plaza, 2016)
In a similar way, the entrance to the Lesvos Solidarity camp celebrates the 
physical ‘safe passage’ of refugees to Lesvos with a display of life jackets on 
the fence alongside the main entrance.  The camp also provides the 
residents with housing, food, clothing, medical assistance, and hygiene kits, 
and relies on both volunteers and residents to keep the facilities clean. The 
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residents are able to cook on their own using food provided by IGOs and 
NGOs as well as by donations. At City Plaza, by contrast, all of the funding for
food and other resources is provided through donations, but refugees join 
with volunteers from both local and international communities to do the 
cooking and clean-up. City Plaza also provides a health clinic one day out of 
the week, and, in another practical safety-assuring practice, runs a security 
work-group comprised of refugees and volunteers that keeps watch over the 
front door of the hotel all day and night. 
ii) Personal Dignity
The day-to-day involvement of refugees in cooking, clean-up and other
site activities is an important way in which both sites seek to accord 
residents with personal dignity. What this means for most people is 
treatment with respect and sociality--being treated as individual human 
beings worthy of attention and considered capable of agency. Refugees, 
volunteers and activists all spoke of the importance of personal human 
connections and interactions for people who have been ripped out of the 
social fabric of their everyday lives at home, and who may also have lost 
family members and friends in their native countries or in the process of 
moving from one place to another. They deserve and are in need of 
friendship and human contact, of being seen and heard. “In Plaza we all live 
together. All kinds of different people. We fight together, we eat together. 
We are all humans” (P., Syria; City Plaza, 2016). Personal dignity is also 
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something that enables individuals to once again see themselves as 
something more than a number to be added to a chart, a mouth to feed, or a
member of a group that must be managed. There is a special pride and 
sense of dignity in being recognized as a person with skills and 
responsibilities, a member of a social community:
“Also in City Plaza, I was for the first time a person with responsibilities
acknowledged by all others. People were coming and asking me what 
to do. That was very special for me” (J., Iran; City Plaza, 2016)
“I work in the storage. I feed all people here. Since I am here I learned 
a lot and I started trusting myself more” (S. Syria; City Plaza, 2016)
These statements are quite different from the reports from the 
Hotspots, and also contrast dramatically with what Michel Agier writes about 
vis-à-vis the condition of vulnerability in many other refugee camps 
worldwide. “What makes them vulnerable is the loss of their own social 
resources, the absence of connections, family or local, that could shoulder 
the burden of their suffering. Their distress may be temporary or lasting, but 
it exists only because their physical or moral handicap is part of an overall 
de-socialization: no longer having ties or anything to do, no interlocutors or 
voices” (Agier, 2011: 147).
By contrast, the geosocial basis for personal dignity at City Plaza and 
Lesvos Solidarity allows refugees to talk with one another and with 
solidarians and volunteers about future options. This ability to plan ahead 
and to believe in a future provides a dignified space in which to imagine 
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something better than life in the camps. Even though the organizers of 
Lesvos Solidarity have no control over the opening and closing of borders 
and the geopolitics of the Hotspots, they have still managed to keep alive a 
spirit of hope and resilience for both migrants and those aiding and working 
with them. For example, following the EU-Turkey deal, and the closing of the 
borders through the Balkan states, when the Greek registration process 
became defined by dysfunction, delay and detention, Lesvos Solidarity 
volunteers and refugees opened up Mosaik, a community center in Mytilene 
offering language classes, practical work experience, skills training and a 
daycare. All of these opportunities provided a space of dignity where 
migrants could remain productively engaged, work on improving their 
languages and life skills, and feel some hope in their future despite their loss 
of forward mobility. In a way that connected these personal opportunities to 
the geosocial construction of spatial liberty, Mosaik also posted bus transit 
schedules, supplied bus passes for island travel to the center for classes, and
disseminated information about resources and services that could be 
accessed by migrants both in Lesvos and Athens (authors' interview with Efi 
Latsoudi, 12/13/2016).
Every time that we visited Mosaik the joy and spirit of optimism that 
this small community center brought to the many people studying and 
working there was palpable. We were shown around the facility by an 
Afghani refugee and a Greek supporter who worked in administration and 
who were both extremely proud of the center and its accomplishments. They
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were delighted to point to the beautiful crafts that were produced by 
migrants, which included holiday ornaments and other items made out of the
interior material of life jackets that had been left on the beaches, as well as 
tote bags, purses, and pencil cases made from the exterior of the life jackets.
Everybody involved was aware of the great irony that these useless life 
jackets were providing some benefit to migrants. A bit like the safe space 
principles used in Hotspot administration, most are ‘faux’ life jackets that 
actually contribute to people sinking and drowning because the interior foam
absorbs water. This is also the same foam that the children had cut out in 
the shape of the Christmas tree decorations for the walls of the common 
room at Lesvos Solidarity. Turning these useless material reminders of 
vulnerability into objects of craftwork and play helped restore at least a small
sense of agency to the migrants. Meanwhile, at Mosaik the money made 
from selling these craft items to international supporters and sympathetic 
tourists was reinvested in the Center, supporting the hiring of professional 
language teachers, the purchase of bus passes for refugees to travel 
between Mytilene and places such as the Moria Hotspot, and the operation of
a small daycare that was free of charge for people enrolled in classes.
iii) Organizational Autonomy
According to its own website: “City Plaza Refugee Accommodation 
Center is based on principles of self-organization and political autonomy. It 
functions through different working groups for cleaning, cooking, security, 
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logistics, education and childcare, medical care, media-work, reception, 
which answer to the regular assemblies of refugees and solidarians” (City 
Plaza, 2017). This was confirmed to us in an interview with one of the first 
organizers and activists involved in the squat, Nasim Lomani (see also 
Lafazani, 2017). Lomani told us that there were three different groups 
involved in creating the City Plaza solidarity effort:  students, leftists, and the
network for social and political rights for migrants. Organizational autonomy 
was a key concern for these groups from the start, as the plan was to 
organize and run a site with migrants as critical participants, not as passive 
receivers of help from outside. He said, “It’s not about charity without 
politics--nor about accepting categories created by the state. It’s about living
together, people helping each other, and for having a politics of resistance” 
(authors' interview with Lomani, 12/07/2016).
Not every resident is necessarily in full agreement with the anarchist 
organization principles and politicization of the squat (Cirefice, 2018). But 
when asked about the origins of the City Plaza, migrants spoke, sometimes 
with humour, about their participation in the political organizing and the 
endless plenaries that were held since the very first day.  From the 
beginning, and as of December, 2016 (8 months after the opening of City 
Plaza), the internal organization has been structured with two assemblies: a 
house assembly focusing on the day to day running of the hotel, and a 
political networking assembly. Each meets once a week to talk about and 
make decisions on the larger issues with which they are confronted as a 
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group. The micro decisions concerning the hotel are made through a 
decentralized system of decision-making by working groups: in addition to 
the security group, these also include the bar, health, kitchen and 
communications groups. According to Lomani, there is a lot of coordination 
and trust between the assemblies and with the working groups, so they are 
able to act and react quickly to problems (authors’ interview, 12/07/2016). 
For example, when there was a fascist attack on a different solidarity squat 
in the city at 4:00am, City Plaza was able to host those displaced by the 
attack within an hour and get a politically inspired message out to the media 
by 7:00am. This was a full day faster than the response of any other political 
group in Athens.
The aim of the assemblies is not to have everyone agree, but to have 
everyone be able to live and work together. “It’s mostly people participating 
and respecting one another and getting the idea of solidarity” (authors' 
interview with Lomani, 12/07/2016). The rules are made for everyone to 
follow, including both refugees and volunteers; they include: “no racism, no 
sexism, no selling of services, no harassment”.  In a strong contrast to the 
territorial labeling and separation of refugees in the Hotspots, the geosocial 
self-organization of rule-making at City Plaza has also worked to diminish 
national differentiation between residents.  When one person suggested 
there should be individual separate assemblies based on nationalities that 
could deal with specific issues for each national group in their own language,
the participants at the assembly collectively decided this was not a good 
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idea because “it would be a mistake to harden national differences like this” 
(authors' interview with Lomani, 12/07/2016). So far there have been no 
group fights, no national fights, and no harassment except for one case of 
spousal abuse. This is vastly different than what is happening in the Hotspots
and even in the informal camps run by charities, many of which are 
experiencing internal violence (authors' interview with Eric and Philippa 
Kempson, volunteers on Lesvos, 12/14/2016). Many of these conflicts are 
based on nationality, which appears to have become increasingly divisive 
among asylum claimants at least partially as a result of the geopolitical 
hierarchy of asylum worthiness managed in the Hotspots. (This hierarchy 
frames Syrian claimants as most worthy, followed by Afghanis and Iraqis; 
asylum claimants from Pakistan or much of Africa understand their origins to 
lead to an automatic sentence for deportation, however much delayed).
At Lesvos Solidarity the organizational structure is similarly democratic
and autonomous from top-down structures of state control. Decisions are 
made in assemblies and residents meetings that are deliberately non-
hierarchical. Also, similar to City Plaza, the organizational tasks are broken 
down into “teams”, with focused specialties. Core organizers are 
compensated monetarily for their work, but most of the many volunteers at 
the camp work for free. The migrants participate in the teams and in the 
overall discussions and assemblies and help to discuss and plan the daily 
operations and future direction of the site. The key overarching thematic, 
which was mentioned to us several times by a number of different people, is 
30
solidarity. The spirit of solidarity informs the organizational structure of the 
camp and is also a constant beacon and goal that guides their everyday 
practices.
iv) Radical Democracy
Geosocially animating solidarity in both sites is an ambition to at once 
embody, exemplify and enact forms of resistance that make a political 
difference by working across state-territorialized difference.  City Plaza was 
formed as an intentional space of political resistance to the agenda and 
policies of the EU and its member states vis-à-vis forced migrants, asylum 
seekers and refugees. Lomani noted thus that “we all wanted to do more 
than just help. We wanted to push to make a difference, to resist” (authors' 
interview with Lomani, 12/07/2016). On the Solidarity Refugee and 
Accommodation website, the direct confrontation with the policies and 
rhetoric of Europe and the EU in relation to migrants and refugees was 
rendered even more explicit. The group’s manifesto is notable, in particular, 
both for its challenge to the status quo, and also for its emphasis on 
solidarity and the practices of grassroots activism that are orchestrated to 
develop spaces of freedom and safety for all--including both locals and 
refugees. 
“The existence of unused, fully equipped hosting facilities right next to 
hundreds of homeless people appeared in our eyes as a scandal in 
itself. A contradiction which reveals not only the hypocrisy of what is 
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called European ‘refugee crisis management,’ but also the inner logic 
of a system in crisis …. By squatting an unused hotel we wanted to be 
paradigmatic, we wanted to stress – as an example – how the social 
movements and society from below are able to improve the living 
conditions of the refugees and thus improve the livelihood of all. We 
share the idea that by claiming the basic rights and providing for the 
needs of refugees, we also put in practice a conception of solidarity in 
everyday life and of self-organization which creates and develops 
spaces of freedom and of common struggles of locals and refugees” 
(City Plaza Website, 2017).
In this passage we can see the connections between the practices of 
radical democracy and those of personal dignity and organizational 
autonomy. The deliberate link between the experiences and struggles of 
both locals and refugees is clear too, and it was also underlined to us by the 
talented cook in the kitchen who, as a Greek anarchist, saw a direct link 
between the protests against precarity by Athenians and the urban activism 
organized in and through City Plaza. Such efforts to connect radical 
democratic practices and claims for equity and justice across the differences 
of citizenship and belonging have resonated with migrants as well. One of 
the longer-term (eight month) residents at City Plaza spoke about his 
experiences in this regard:
“In Athens I demonstrated the first time also with Greeks and people 
from other countries.” (M., Afghanistan; City Plaza, 2016).
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Relatedly, a German solidarian, whom we also met working in the kitchen, 
explained in an online interview how she sees the everyday life of City Plaza 
residents connecting such local political actions with wider international 
struggles.
So, one main issue of the project is about organising day-to-day life in 
a collective and equal way. At the same time, however, it is also about 
wider struggles against borders, exclusion and discrimination 
(Lafazani, 2017).
At Lesvos Solidarity there is a similar interest in making connections 
between democratic struggles and claims for justice for vulnerable groups 
across citizenship divides. Two of the volunteers we worked with on the 
‘clothing team’ told us that sweaters and other needed items of clothing and 
food were often distributed to Greek people in need, as well as to migrants 
across the island. This was confirmed by one of the original founders of the 
site, the UNHCR Nansen award winner Efi Latsoudi. She noted in an interview
that Lesvos Solidarity was careful to share resources with impoverished 
Greek citizens in need in an effort to both lessen resentment and to better 
articulate and manifest the similar experiences of precarity (authors’ 
interview with Latsoudi, December, 2016). As with City Plaza, Latsoudi and 
the other Lesvos Solidarity members described the roots of the “crisis” as 
something that envelops everyone at the bottom of the economic pyramid--
refugees and locals alike. This geosocial awareness of what connects across 
different kinds of vulnerability stands in stark opposition to Hotspot 
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geopolitics, while also offering migrants a spatial basis on which to tie their 
personal political freedom struggle to that of others near and far.
A shared feature of radical democracy for both Lesvos Solidarity and 
City Plaza is thus the emphasis on tackling injustice rhetorically and 
pragmatically at both local and global scales. There is a strong effort by all of
the activists and migrants to make visible the most egregious aspects of 
both the Greek austerity crisis and EU policies on migrants to demonstrate 
how these processes are interconnected. Moreover, both solidarity 
movements rely on transnational activist networks to get this message out 
globally, and to solicit support. These socially-mediated efforts to cross 
borders and share messages internationally work geosocially to at once 
articulate and activate a kind of transnational ‘demos’ of all those concerned 
with migrant safety. Yet, by rendering differences in power across this demos
open to radical democratic debate, they also raise important concerns about 
inequalities in spatial mobility.
v) Spatial Liberty
Both sites are deeply concerned with providing refugees with more 
mobility options. Information flyers on how to find health clinics and other 
resource centers when moving from Lesvos to Athens are prominently on 
display at Lesvos Solidarity, and meetings in the lounge-bar at the City Plaza 
often involve discussions on how to help refugee families re-unite in 
Germany or how to get out to the Athens Hotspots for asylum appeals. 
Beyond these practical responses to the coercive immobility of the Hotspots, 
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the two solidarity sites are also places where we witnessed other more 
quotidian geosocial efforts to help migrants become free to move in and 
around the camp and hotel.
The residents at Lesvos Solidarity are fully autonomous in their use of 
cooking and cleaning facilities, washing, gardening, working, and in their 
right to enter and exit the camp at will. This is a clear distinction from the 
concentration camp feel of Moria’s main gate.  Even if many Moria 
inhabitants were able to come and go freely at the time of our visit, the 
threat of a lock-down was ever-present.  For the same reason, several of the 
residents of Lesvos Solidarity that we spoke with indicated how lucky they 
felt to be in this particular refugee site. They spoke of it as a community that 
was safe and open--contrasting it directly with Moria. They appreciated the 
freedom they had to come and go and contrasted this with their personal 
experiences of Moria, or what they had heard from others who had been or 
were still detained there. 
After a long struggle with the local authorities and a few resistant 
locals, the children at Lesvos Solidarity are now allowed to attend the 
neighborhood school with the local children. Unlike the other migrant camps 
on the island it is perceived as a place where migrants have some 
opportunity to integrate into the wider society. When we visited the site for 
the first time, nearly all of the children were at a movie in Mytilene. We also 
witnessed residents creating a new garden space for themselves, as well as 
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moving freely into and out of the camp, and working in the Mosaik 
community center.
Similarly, in City Plaza the residents are at liberty to leave the hotel at 
any time, find work if possible, and participate in activities both inside and 
outside the hotel. Efforts to help integrate the migrants with the wider 
society (and each other) include language lessons, parties, and visits from 
the children at the school next door. When we were at City Plaza, for 
example, students from the neighboring school came to learn about the 
squat, talk with the residents, volunteers, and activists, and provide both 
financial and moral support, and they subsequently co-organized a Christmas
holiday singing session together back at the school. Long after our visit, we 
heard that City Plaza residents also won the right for their children to attend 
the local Athens schools, and a related picture of them outside the hotel 
holding a sign saying ‘WE LIVE AND LEARN TOGETHER’ was published in the 
Guardian.
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Figure 1: CITY PLAZA – WE LIVE AND LEARN TOGETHER by kind permission of Nasim Lomani
vi) Social Community
The volunteer coordinator at Lesvos Solidarity underlined that 
“solidarity” really was a central feature of the camp. She said in an interview,
“We all live together and work together--we play by the same rules. It’s a 
family” (authors' interview 12/13/2016). Solidarity is also a key term, 
process, and goal at City Plaza. As Lomani noted, “City Plaza Hotel is against 
EU policy… it’s not about a charity without politics, nor about accepting the 
categories created by the state. It’s for living together, for people helping 
each other, and for having a politics of resistance” (authors' interview with 
Lomani, 12/07/2016). For both of these people, part of the politics of these 
spaces is how they are organized as an expression of social solidarity, as a 
social community built out of diverse groups of people willing to live together
and stand up for each other in times of trouble. The diversity of the social 
community in both sites is expressed in every way possible--from nationality,
ethnicity and race, to ability, class, age, gender, and citizenship. Knowing 
that others who were “strangers” at first can become like family through 
sleeping, eating, and working together, binds people together through time:
“The first day I was very scared. Everybody was a stranger to me. Now,
when I enter it’s like my mothers and fathers home” (S., Syria; City 
Plaza, 2016).
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“I feel we live all together in one house--400 people sharing a home in 
equality and with plurality” (N., Afghanistan; City Plaza, 2016).
“Living all together is very good. There is a lot of humanity. It is like my
mothers and fathers house. I feel at home. I cannot fall asleep 
elsewhere anymore.” (B., Afghanistan; City Plaza, 2016).
When Judith Butler visited City Plaza in May, 2016, she addressed the 
importance of co-habitation that is also attuned to social power relations. 
She noted how European racism has led to “expelling its other,” and pointed 
to the ways that the experiment of solidarity at City Plaza works on 
“breaking down the presumptions of that racism, not just by welcoming 
others but by insisting on living with them. Living together” (Butler, 2016).  
This is a kind of solidarity based on radical democracy and embedded in the 
sociality of everyday life at its most basic: that of spatially living together. 
This type of solidarity-through-proximity and everyday life is also 
vital in ties with the wider Greek population that has been made similarly 
precarious by austerity. For social community and solidarity to take root 
across differences of citizenship and belonging it is important for people to 
come together in intimate circumstances through living, working, learning, 
demonstrating, and just plain existing in proximate spaces (for example, 
through the central, downtown locations of the City Plaza and Mosaik and the
near proximity of Lesvos Solidarity to Mytilene). The centrality of these sites 
is, once again, in sharp distinction from the geopolitically detached Hotspots,
all of which are located far from urban centers. It embodies instead how the 
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Greek word for solidarity (αλληλεγγύη or allilengýi) refers to the act of being 
close to others. 
Conclusion
 The comparisons between our examples highlight how the meaning 
of safe space is continually being redefined in and through Europe’s 
borderlands in Greece. We have shown that the safe spaces created through
grassroots organizing are sustained through solidarity in ways that both 
practically counter-point and politically contest humanitarian claims about 
Hotspots creating safe space. The embodied geosocial solidarity practices 
exist in sharp contrast with the geopolitical projections and projects that 
make big claims about safety, but which have constructed spaces that 
create ongoing forms of insecurity for migrants through the abstract rules 
and spatial reterritorialization effects of the Hotspots.  Countering and 
contesting the depersonalizing care-and-control created by Hotspot 
geopolitics, the geosocial work of creating safe spaces through solidarity 
instead aims at securing embodied experiences of socialized care and 
personalized control based on collaboration and cohabitation. 
Nevertheless, despite the clear differences between the solidarity 
spaces and the Hotspots, it has to be acknowledged that most migrants still 
find themselves in the challenging borderlands where the geopolitical and 
geosocial projects contend with one another.  It is not as if City Plaza and 
Lesvos Solidarity provide for completely free zones of full enfranchisement 
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with pan-European mobility rights and citizenship rights.  Instead, for the 
limited numbers of people they can accommodate, they provide spaces 
where modest advances in safety, dignity, autonomy, democracy, liberty, 
and community are enabled amidst and against European efforts to project 
geopolitical order onto the borderlands. The Pakistani teenager we drove into
Mytiline expressed great enthusiasm for the community spirit and work 
opportunities afforded by Mosaik, and yet he also told us of his repeated 
harassment by the local police while sleeping rough around the city, and of 
his deep fear of being captured and sent back to Moria.  Similarly, many of 
the conversations we joined as volunteers chopping vegetables and washing 
up in the City Plaza kitchen concerned how to navigate the bureaucratic 
maze of the asylum application and appeals processes administered out of 
the Athens Hotspots.  In other words, migrants who inhabited and benefited 
from the spaces of solidarity still had to contend with Hotspot power 
relations. They still experienced the disempowerment of sub-citizenship, and 
yet they also expressed relief and appreciation about the ways in which City 
Plaza and Lesvos Solidarity made their personal efforts at remaking their 
lives more viable.  In Foucauldian terms, these geosocial spaces of solidarity 
enable ‘making live’ to become a biopolitical possibility (even as they remain
overshadowed by an ongoing geopolitics of rejectionism). In the Hotspots, by
contrast, what Agier calls the “cursor of biopolitics” appears to be moving 
“away from ‘keeping alive’ and towards ‘letting die’” (Agier, 2011: 211). 
Conceptualized in this way, it is possible to view the solidarity spaces as 
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creating a more personalized and socialized form of 'making live' on borders 
that remain, nevertheless, constrained by the liberal biopolitics of European 
governmentality.  The solidaristic efforts to advance improvements in 
enfranchisement, safety, dignity, autonomy, democracy, liberty, and 
community can thus be seen as a variety of post-liberal and anti-neoliberal 
innovations in humanitarianism itself.
Another recent article in this journal has argued that the Hotspots 
themselves serve as what Simon Reid-Henry calls a ‘liberal diagnostic,’ at 
once indexing and policing the limits of a liberal humanitarianism defined by
care-turned-control (Pallister-Wilkins, 2018).  In our own investigation of the 
contrasts between Hotspots and solidarity spaces we are able to 
supplement Reid-Henry’s argument by demonstrating how the solidarity 
spaces index and encode efforts to both counter and reconstitute 
humanitarianism in post-liberal and anti-neoliberal ways.  They remain 
efforts informed by what Fassin (2012) calls ‘humanitarian reason’--offering 
welcome and hospitality to strangers while constantly renegotiating the 
tensions between inequality and solidarity. But by being attuned to 
biographical lives rather than just the biological life of migrants as a 
management problem, they reverse the rationalities of depersonalized care-
turned-control in governmentalized humanitarianism. By doing so they 
fashion forms of geosocial solidarity that contest the projections and 
administration of geopolitical control.
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There is more fine-grained complexity than can be fully elucidated 
here.  But to give just a few brief examples, City Plaza has sought to 
advance active resistance against official Greek and European rule-making, 
and thus refuses charity and volunteerism in the name of collaborative 
urban activism and the pan-European struggle against neoliberal austerity. 
Meanwhile, back at the main gates of Moria, European and Greek hospitality
is still extant in the form of local merchants setting up tables and feeding 
people (and taking a remarkably wide range of global currency as payment).
This too is a kind of civil society contribution to making live – even if it is 
located close to the forbidding fencing of barbed wire across the road, and a
recent spray-painted sign saying ‘Welcome to Prison’ (Masri, 2018).  Many 
other individuals and groups struggle every day to make migrants in Europe 
safer. These people range from volunteers—such as the Kempsons, whom 
we met on Lesvos, who provide food, blankets, and care to boat arrivals on 
the northern beaches, to the Greek coastguard sailors who worked tirelessly
to save lives throughout 2015, when 4000 refugees were arriving on the 
island per day.
It should be underlined that all of these efforts to extend embodied 
safety for migrants continue to be threatened by the geopolitical tensions 
for which the Hotspots were themselves initially presented as a response.  
From the time this article was first drafted in February 2017, many more 
boatloads of refugees have continued to capsize and kill in horrific numbers,
including 15 more people who drowned in the Aegean just as we revised this
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conclusion (Papadimas, 2018).  The war in Syria continues to generate 
suffering and refugees on a terrible scale, as do other forms of violence 
across the Middle East and much of Africa. Finally, the hyper-nationalism to 
which Hotspot humanitarianism was designed as an organized EU 
alternative has itself gone global. Taken together, these events and policies 
make it ever harder for those providing geosocial forms of protection to 
secure any kind of sustainable safety for refugees in the EU and, 
increasingly, worldwide.
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